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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we must decide whether certain franchise 
tying restrictions support a claim for violation of federal 
antitrust laws. Eleven franchisees of Domino's Pizza stores 
and the International Franchise Advisory Council, Inc. filed 
suit against Domino's Pizza, Inc., alleging violations of 
federal antitrust laws, breach of contract, and tortious 
interference with contract. The district court dismissed the 
antitrust claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted, because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege a valid relevant market. The 
district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the plaintiffs' remaining common law claims. Queen 
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). We will affirm. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. 
 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. is a fast-food service company that 
sells pizza through a national network of over 4200 stores. 
Domino's Pizza owns and operates approximately 700 of 
these stores. Independent franchisees own and operate the 
remaining 3500. Domino's Pizza, Inc. is the second largest 
pizza company in the United States, with revenues in 
excess of $1.8 billion per year. 
 
A franchisee joins the Domino's system by executing a 
standard franchise agreement with Domino's Pizza, Inc. 
Under the franchise agreement, the franchisee receives the 
right to sell pizza under the "Domino's" name and format. 
In return, Domino's Pizza receives franchise fees and 
royalties. 
 
The essence of a successful nationwide fast-food chain is 
product uniformity and consistency. Uniformity benefits 
franchisees because customers can purchase pizza from 
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any Domino's store and be certain the pizza will taste 
exactly like the Domino's pizza with which they are familiar. 
This means that individual franchisees need not build up 
their own good will. Uniformity also benefits the franchisor. 
It ensures the brand name will continue to attract and hold 
customers, increasing franchise fees and royalties.1 
 
For these reasons, section 12.2 of the Domino's Pizza 
standard franchise agreement requires that all pizza 
ingredients, beverages, and packaging materials used by a 
Domino's franchisee conform to the standards set by 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. Section 12.2 also provides that 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. "may in our sole discretion require that 
ingredients, supplies and materials used in the preparation, 
packaging, and delivery of pizza be purchased exclusively 
from us or from approved suppliers or distributors." 
Domino's Pizza reserves the right "to impose reasonable 
limitations on the number of approved suppliers or 
distributors of any product." To enforce these rights, 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. retains the power to inspect franchisee 
stores and to test materials and ingredients. Section 12.2 is 
subject to a reasonableness clause providing that Domino's 
Pizza, Inc. must "exercise reasonable judgment with respect 
to all determinations to be made by us under the terms of 
this Agreement." 
 Under the standard franchise agreement, Domino's Pizza, 
Inc. sells approximately 90% of the $500 million in 
ingredients and supplies used by Domino's franchisees.2 
These sales, worth some $450 million per year, form a 
significant part of Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s profits. 
Franchisees purchase only 10% of their ingredients and 
supplies from outside sources. With the exception of fresh 
dough, Domino's Pizza, Inc. does not manufacture the 
products it sells to franchisees. Instead, it purchases these 
products from approved suppliers and then resells them to 
the franchisees at a markup. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See the analysis of the economics of franchising in Warren S. Grimes, 
When Do Franchisors Have Market Power?, 65 Antitrust L.J. 105, 107- 
110 (1996). 
 
2. Domino's Pizza, Inc. sells ingredients and supplies through its 
division, Domino's Pizza Distribution Division, "DPDD." DPDD was 
formerly a subsidiary of Domino's Pizza, Inc. 
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B. 
 
The plaintiffs in this case are eleven Domino's franchisees 
and the International Franchise Advisory Council, 
Inc. ("IFAC"), a Michigan corporation consisting of 
approximately 40% of the Domino's franchisees in the 
United States, formed to promote their common interests.3 
The plaintiffs contend that Domino's Pizza, Inc. has a 
monopoly in "the $500 million aftermarket for sales of 
supplies to Domino's franchisees" and has used its 
monopoly power to unreasonably restrain trade, limit 
competition, and extract supra-competitive profits. Plaintiffs 
point to several actions by Domino's Pizza, Inc. to support 
their claims. 
 
First, plaintiffs allege that Domino's Pizza, Inc. has 
restricted their ability to purchase competitively priced 
dough. Most franchisees purchase all of their fresh dough 
from Domino's Pizza, Inc. Plaintiffs here attempted to lower 
costs by making fresh pizza dough on site. They contend 
that in response, Domino's Pizza, Inc. increased processing 
fees and altered quality standards and inspection practices 
for store-produced dough, which eliminated all potential 
savings and financial incentives to make their own dough. 
Plaintiffs also allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. prohibited stores 
that produce dough from selling their dough to other 
franchisees, even though the dough-producing stores were 
willing to sell dough at a price 25% to 40% below Domino's 
Pizza, Inc.'s price. 
 
Next, plaintiffs object to efforts by Domino's Pizza, Inc. to 
block IFAC's attempt to buy less expensive ingredients and 
supplies from other sources. In June 1994, IFAC entered 
into a purchasing agreement with FoodService Purchasing 
Cooperative, Inc. (FPC). Under the agreement, FPC was 
appointed the purchasing agent for IFAC-member Domino's 
franchisees. FPC was charged with developing a cooperative 
purchasing plan under which participating franchisees 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Domino's Pizza, Inc. argued before the district court that IFAC is 
without standing in this case. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, 
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The district court 
apparently found it unnecessary to address this issue in light of its 
order 
dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. 
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could obtain supplies and ingredients at reduced cost from 
suppliers other than Domino's Pizza, Inc. Plaintiffs contend 
that when Domino's Pizza, Inc. became aware of these 
efforts, it intentionally issued ingredient and supply 
specifications so vague that potential suppliers could not 
provide FPC with meaningful price quotations. 
 
Plaintiffs also allege Domino's Pizza entered into exclusive 
dealing arrangements with several franchisees in order to 
deny FPC access to a pool of potential buyers sufficiently 
large to make the alternative purchasing scheme 
economically feasible. In addition, plaintiffs contend 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. commenced anti-competitive predatory 
pricing to shut FPC out of the market. For example, they 
maintain that Domino's Pizza, Inc. lowered prices on many 
ingredients and supplies to a level competitive with FPC's 
prices and then recouped lost profits by raising the price on 
fresh dough, which FPC could not supply. Further, 
plaintiffs contend Domino's Pizza, Inc. entered into 
exclusive dealing arrangements with the only approved 
suppliers of ready-made deep dish crusts and sauce. Under 
these agreements, the suppliers were obligated to deliver 
their entire output to Domino's Pizza, Inc. Plaintiffs allege 
the purpose of these agreements was to prevent FPC from 
purchasing these critical pizza components for resale to 
franchisees. 
 
Finally, plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. refused to 
sell fresh dough to franchisees unless the franchisees 
purchased other ingredients and supplies from Domino's 
Pizza, Inc. As a result of these and other alleged practices, 
plaintiffs maintain that each franchisee store now pays 
between $3000 and $10,000 more per year for ingredients 
and supplies than it would in a competitive market. 
Plaintiffs allege these costs are passed on to consumers. 
 
C. 
 
As noted, eleven Domino's franchisees and IFAC filed an 
amended complaint in United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Domino's Pizza, 
Inc. seeking declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory 
relief under SS 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1 
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and 2. The plaintiffs also sought damages for breach of 
contract, breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing, and tortious interference with contractual relations.4 
 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. moved to dismiss the antitrust 
claims for failure to state a claim, contending the plaintiffs 
failed to allege a "relevant market," a basic pleading 
requirement for claims under both S 1 and S 2 of the 
Sherman antitrust act. They maintained that the relevant 
market defined in the complaint -- the "market" in 
Domino's-approved ingredients and supplies used by 
Domino's Pizza franchisees -- was invalid as a matter of 
law because the boundaries of the proposed relevant 
market were defined by contractual terms contained in the 
franchise agreement, and not measured by cross-elasticity 
of demand or product interchangeability. 
 
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss 
with prejudice plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims. The 
district court observed that "in order to state a Sherman 
Act claim under either S 1 or S 2, a plaintiff must identify 
the relevant product and geographic markets and allege 
that the defendant exercises market power within those 
markets." Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 
F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Noting that plaintiffs 
did "not explicitly identify the relevant product and 
geographic markets in their amended complaint," the court 
said that "it is clear from the context, and confirmed in 
their memorandum in opposition to the instant motion, 
that Plaintiffs consider the relevant product market to be 
the market for ingredients and supplies among Domino's 
franchisees." Id. at 1061. Rejecting this concept of the 
relevant market, the court held that "antitrust claims 
predicated upon a `relevant market' defined by the bounds 
of a franchise agreement are not cognizable." Id. at 1063. 
The court noted that Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s power to force 
plaintiffs to purchase ingredients and supplies from them 
stemmed "not from the unique nature of the product or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The plaintiffs originally filed the complaint on behalf of themselves 
and 
a purported class of all present and future Domino's franchisees in the 
United States. Their amended complaint abandoned their claim to 
represent all Domino's franchisees. 
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from its market share in the fast food franchise business, 
but from the franchise agreement." Id. at 1062. For that 
reason, plaintiffs' claims "implicate principles of contract, 
and are not the concern of the antitrust laws." Id. The 
district court also held plaintiffs had failed adequately to 
allege harm to competition, "a bedrock premise of antitrust 
law." Id. at 1063. Because plaintiffs failed to assert a 
cognizable antitrust claim and there was neither diversity 
among the parties nor special circumstances justifying 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, the court dismissed 
without prejudice plaintiffs' common law claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1063-64. 
 
The district court granted plaintiffs leave to file an 
amended complaint to cure the jurisdictional pleading 
deficiencies in their state law claims. Plaintiffs decided not 
to replead their state law claims. Instead, they sought to 
amend their complaint for a second time in an attempt to 
state a valid federal antitrust claim. The district court 
denied their motion, noting that though the plaintiffs' 
proposed second amended complaint would cure the failure 
to plead harm to competition, it would not cure the failure 
to allege a valid relevant market. The court stated: 
"Plaintiffs do not and cannot purchase ingredients and 
supplies from alternative suppliers not because Domino's 
dominates the ingredient and supply market or because 
Defendant is the market's only supplier, but because the 
franchisee-plaintiffs are contractually bound to purchase 
only from suppliers approved by Defendant. It is economic 
power resulting from the franchise agreement, therefore, 
and not market power, that defines the `relevant market' 
Plaintiffs allege in support of their antitrust claims." The 
district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that a different 
result was required under the Supreme Court's decision in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 
U.S. 451 (1992). This appeal followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the antitrust 
counts under 15 U.S.C. SS 15 and 26 and 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1337. It declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the common law counts. We have 
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the 
district court's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) is plenary. Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
Plaintiffs assert six distinct antitrust claims on appeal. 
First, plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. has monopolized 
the market in pizza supplies and ingredients for use in 
Domino's stores, in violation of S 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 2. In support of this contention, plaintiffs allege 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. has sufficient market power to control 
prices and exclude competition in this market. Second, 
plaintiffs contend Domino's Pizza, Inc. has attempted to 
monopolize the market for Domino's pizza supplies and 
ingredients, in violation of S 2 of the Sherman Act. Third, 
plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s exclusive dealing 
arrangements have unreasonably restrained trade in 
violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S 1. Fourth, 
plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. imposed an unlawful 
tying arrangement5 by requiring franchisees to buy 
ingredients and supplies from them as a condition of 
obtaining fresh dough, in violation of the Sherman Act S 1, 
15 U.S.C. S 1. Fifth, plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. 
imposed an unlawful tying arrangement by requiring 
franchisees to buy ingredients and supplies "as a condition 
of their continued enjoyment of rights and services under 
their Standard Franchise Agreement," in violation of S 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. Sixth, plaintiffs allege 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. has monopoly power in a relevant 
"market for reasonably interchangeable franchise 
opportunities facing prospective franchisees," in violation of 
S 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2. This last claim was 
not raised before the district court. 
 
As we have noted, the district court held that none of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "In a tying arrangement, the seller sells one item, known as the tying 
product, on the condition that the buyer also purchases another item, 
known as the tied product." Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business 
Machines Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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 plaintiffs' antitrust claims was cognizable under federal law. 
We will analyze each claim in turn. 
 
A. 
 
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs argue that "relevant 
market determinations are inherently fact intensive, and 
therefore are inappropriate for disposition on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion." (Appellant's brief at 16). It is true that in 
most cases, proper market definition can be determined 
only after a factual inquiry into the commercial realities 
faced by consumers. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992). Plaintiffs 
err, however, when they try to turn this general rule into a 
per se prohibition against dismissal of antitrust claims for 
failure to plead a relevant market under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). 
 
Plaintiffs have the burden of defining the relevant market. 
Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania , 24 F.3d 508, 
512 (3d Cir. 1994); Tunis Bros Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
952 F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1991). "The outer boundaries of 
a product market are determined by the reasonable 
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand 
between the product itself and substitutes for it." Brown 
Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); Tunis Brothers, 
952 F.2d at 722 (same). Where the plaintiff fails to define 
its proposed relevant market with reference to the rule of 
reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of 
demand, or alleges a proposed relevant market that clearly 
does not encompass all interchangeable substitute 
products even when all factual inferences are granted in 
plaintiff 's favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient 
and a motion to dismiss may be granted. See, e.g., TV 
Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, 
Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
district court's dismissal of claim for failure to plead a 
relevant market; proposed relevant market consisting of 
only one specific television channel defined too narrowly); 
Tower Air, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 270 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Because a relevant market includes all 
products that are reasonably interchangeable, plaintiff's 
failure to define its market by reference to the rule of 
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reasonable interchangeability is, standing alone, valid 
grounds for dismissal."); B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude 
Delft v. Hologic, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(dismissal for failure to plead a valid relevant market; 
plaintiffs failed to define market in terms of reasonable 
interchangeability or explain rationale underlying narrow 
proposed market definition); Re-Alco Industries, Inc. v. Nat'l 
Center for Health Educ., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (dismissal for failure to plead a valid relevant market; 
plaintiff failed to allege that specific health education 
product was unique or explain why product was not part of 
the larger market for health education materials); E.& G. 
Gabriel v. Gabriel Bros., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 0894, 1994 WL 
369147 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissal for failure to plead valid 
relevant market; proposed relevant market legally 
insufficient because it clearly contained varied items with 
no cross-elasticity of demand). 
 
B. 
 
Plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. has willfully acquired 
and maintained a monopoly in the market for ingredients, 
supplies, materials and distribution services used in the 
operation of Domino's stores, in violation of S 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2. Section 2 sanctions those "who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations." "The offense of monopoly 
under S 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n. 19 (1985) (quoting 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966)). See also Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, 
Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 749 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Bonjourno v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (same). 
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The district court dismissed plaintiffs' S 2 monopoly 
claims for failure to plead a valid relevant market. Plaintiffs 
suggest the "ingredients, supplies, materials, and 
distribution services used by and in the operation of 
Domino's pizza stores" constitutes a relevant market for 
antitrust purposes. We disagree. 
 
As we have noted, the outer boundaries of a relevant 
market are determined by reasonable interchangeability of 
use. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 
504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992); Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S. , 370 U.S. 
294, 325 (1962); Tunis Brothers Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991). "Interchangeability 
implies that one product is roughly equivalent to another 
for the use to which it is put; while there may be some 
degree of preference for the one over the other, either would 
work effectively. A person needing transportation to work 
could accordingly buy a Ford or a Chevrolet automobile, or 
could elect to ride a horse or bicycle, assuming those 
options were feasible." Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International 
Business Machines Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotations omitted). When assessing reasonable 
interchangeability, "[f]actors to be considered include price, 
use, and qualities." Tunis Brothers, 952 F.2d at 722. 
Reasonable interchangeability is also indicated by"cross- 
elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it." Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 
325 (1962). As we explained in Tunis Brothers Co., Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991), "products 
in a relevant market [are] characterized by a cross-elasticity 
of demand, in other words, the rise in the price of a good 
within a relevant product market would tend to create a 
greater demand for other like goods in that market." Tunis 
Brothers, 952 F.2d at 722.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cross-elasticity is a measure of reasonable interchangeability. As one 
treatise observes: "The economic tool most commonly referred to in 
determining what should be included in the market from which one then 
determines the defendant's market share is cross-elasticity of demand. 
Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of the substitutability of 
products from the point of view of buyers. More technically, it measures 
the responsiveness of the demand for one product to changes in the 
price of a different product." E. Thomas Sullivan and Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Understanding Antitrust and its Economic Implications 217 (1994). 
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Here, the dough, tomato sauce, and paper cups that meet 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. standards and are used by Domino's 
stores are interchangeable with dough, sauce and cups 
available from other suppliers and used by other pizza 
companies. Indeed, it is the availability of interchangeable 
ingredients of comparable quality from other suppliers, at 
lower cost, that motivates this lawsuit. Thus, the relevant 
market, which is defined to include all reasonably 
interchangeable products, cannot be restricted solely to 
those products currently approved by Domino's Pizza, Inc. 
for use by Domino's franchisees. For that reason, we must 
reject plaintiffs' proposed relevant market. 
 
Of course, Domino's-approved pizza ingredients and 
supplies differ from other available ingredients and supplies 
in one crucial manner. Only Domino's-approved products 
may be used by Domino's franchisees without violating 
section 12.2 of Domino's standard franchise agreement. 
Plaintiffs suggest that this difference is sufficient by itself to 
create a relevant market in approved products. We 
disagree. The test for a relevant market is not commodities 
reasonably interchangeable by a particular plaintiff, but 
"commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for 
the same purposes." United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); Tunis Brothers, 
952 F.2d at 722. A court making a relevant market 
determination looks not to the contractual restraints 
assumed by a particular plaintiff when determining whether 
a product is interchangeable, but to the uses to which the 
product is put by consumers in general. Thus, the relevant 
inquiry here is not whether a Domino's franchisee may 
reasonably use both approved or non-approved products 
interchangeably without triggering liability for breach of 
contract, but whether pizza makers in general might use 
such products interchangeably. Clearly, they could. Were 
we to adopt plaintiffs' position that contractual restraints 
render otherwise identical products non-interchangeable for 
purposes of relevant market definition, any exclusive 
dealing arrangement, output or requirement contract, or 
franchise tying agreement would support a claim for 
violation of antitrust laws. Perhaps for this reason, no court 
has defined a relevant product market with reference to the 
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particular contractual restraints of the plaintiff.7 Indeed, 
the only cases we have found involving similar claims 
rejected plaintiffs' position as a matter of law. See United 
Farmers Agents Ass'n, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 89 
F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Economic power derived from 
contractual arrangements such as franchises or in this 
case, the agents' contract with Farmers', has nothing to do 
with market power, ultimate consumers' welfare, or 
antitrust.") (internal citation and quotation omitted), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 960 (1997); Ajir v. Exxon 
Corp., No. C 93-20830, 1995 WL 429234, *3 (N.D. Ca.) 
("Just because Exxon's direct serve dealers may 
contractually purchase gasoline from only one source-- 
Exxon -- does not mean that the relevant market is Exxon 
gasoline"; the correct relevant market is all gasoline). See 
also Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 
1570 n. 39 (11th Cir. 1991) (declining to reach issue but 
noting the district court rejected plaintiffs' claim that 
proposed market for sales of supplies to Long John Silver's 
fast food stores was a relevant market for antitrust 
purposes). 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision 
defining relevant markets in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) requires a 
different outcome. We disagree. 
 
In Kodak, the Supreme Court observed that a market is 
defined with reference to reasonable interchangeability. 
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482. The Court held that the market for 
repair parts and services for Kodak photo-copiers was a 
valid relevant market because repair parts and services for 
Kodak machines are not interchangeable with the service 
and parts used to fix other copiers. Id. Plaintiffs suggest 
that Kodak supports its proposed relevant market because 
it indicates that in some circumstances, a single brand of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 833 F.2d 1342 (9th 
Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that 
market power exists in three circumstances: where the government has 
granted a seller a patent or similar monopoly, where the seller possesses 
a unique product, or where the seller possesses a high market share. Id. 
at 1345-1346. The court made no mention of contractual limitations as 
a source of market power. 
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a product or service may constitute a relevant market. This 
is correct where the commodity is unique, and therefore not 
interchangeable with other products. But here, it is 
uncontested that contractual restraints aside, the sauce, 
dough, and other products and ingredients approved for 
use by Domino's franchisees are interchangeable with other 
items available on the market. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that they face information and 
switching costs that "lock them in" to their position as 
Domino's franchisees, making it economically impracticable 
for them to abandon the Domino's system and enter a 
different line of business. They argue that under Kodak, the 
fact that they are "locked in" supports their claim that an 
"aftermarket" for Domino's-approved supplies is a relevant 
market for antitrust purposes. We believe plaintiffs misread 
Kodak. 
 
The defendants in Kodak argued that there was no 
relevant market in Kodak repair parts, even if they were 
unique and non-interchangeable with other repair parts, 
because of cross-elasticity of demand between parts prices 
and copier sales. If the price of parts were raised too high, 
defendants contended, it would decrease demand for copiers.8 
The Court held that whether there was cross-elasticity of 
demand between parts and copiers was, in this case, a 
factual question that could not be determined as a matter 
of law. The Court reached this conclusion because 
switching and information costs arise when one purchases 
an expensive piece of equipment like a copier. In some 
circumstances, these costs might create an economic lock- 
in that could reduce or eliminate the cross-elasticity of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In a typical antitrust case, plaintiffs assert that the products or 
services in their proposed relevant market are reasonably 
interchangeable because they possess positive cross-elasticity of 
demand: a rise in the price of one product in the market will increase 
demand for the other items in the market. By contrast, in Kodak the 
defendants argued that Kodak copier parts, though not reasonably 
interchangeable with the copiers themselves, were not a relevant market 
because of negative cross-elasticity between parts and copiers: an 
increase in the price of parts would, they argued, decrease demand for 
copiers using those parts. 
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demand between copiers and the repair parts for those 
copiers. 
 
Kodak, we believe, held that a plaintiff's proposed 
relevant market in a unique and non-interchangeable 
derivative product or service cannot be defeated on 
summary judgment by a defendant's assertion that the 
proposed derivative market is cross-elastic with the primary 
market, if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
defendant's assertion about cross-elasticity is factually 
incorrect. But Kodak does not hold that the existence of 
information and switching costs alone, such as those faced 
by the Domino's franchisees,9 renders an otherwise invalid 
relevant market valid.10 In Kodak, the repair parts and 
service were unique and there was a question of fact about 
cross-elasticity. Judgment as a matter of law was therefore 
inappropriate. Here, it is uncontroverted that Domino's- 
approved supplies and ingredients are fully interchangeable 
in all relevant respects with other pizza supplies outside the 
proposed relevant market. For this reason, dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' claim as a matter of law is appropriate. 
 
Kodak is distinguishable from the present appeal in other 
important respects. The Kodak case arose out of concerns 
about unilateral changes in Kodak's parts and repairs 
policies. When the copiers were first sold, Kodak relied on 
purchasers to obtain service from independent service 
providers. Later, it chose to use its power over the market 
in unique replacement parts to squeeze the independent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. A franchisee considering exiting one franchise system faces 
information costs associated with researching alternative investment 
opportunities and switching costs stemming from the loss of invested 
funds that may not be recovered if it abandons its current business and 
start-up costs associated with the new venture. 
 
10. If Kodak repair parts had not been unique, but rather, could be 
obtained from additional sources at a reasonable price, Kodak could not 
have forced copier purchasers to buy repair parts from Kodak. This 
would be true even if the copier purchasers faced information and 
switching costs that locked them into to use of Kodak copiers. This fact 
indicates that switching and information costs alone cannot create 
market power. Rather, it is the lack of a competitive market in the object 
to be purchased -- for instance, a competitive market in Kodak parts -- 
that gives a company market power. 
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service providers out of the repair market and to force 
copier purchasers to obtain service directly from Kodak, at 
higher cost. Because this change in policy was not foreseen 
at the time of sale, buyers had no ability to calculate these 
higher costs at the time of purchase and incorporate them 
into their purchase decision. In contrast, plaintiffs here 
knew that Domino's Pizza retained significant power over 
their ability to purchase cheaper supplies from alternative 
sources because that authority was spelled out in detail in 
section 12.2 of the standard franchise agreement. Unlike 
the plaintiffs in Kodak, the Domino's franchisees could 
assess the potential costs and economic risks at the time 
they signed the franchise agreement. The franchise 
transaction between Domino's Pizza, Inc. and plaintiffs was 
subjected to competition at the pre-contract stage. That 
cannot be said of the conduct challenged in Kodak because 
it was not authorized by contract terms disclosed at the 
time of the original transaction. Kodak's sale of its product 
involved no contractual framework for continuing relations 
with the purchaser. But a franchise agreement regulating 
supplies, inspections, and quality standards structures an 
ongoing relationship between franchisor and franchisee 
designed to maintain good will. These differences between 
the Kodak transaction and franchise transactions are 
compelling.11 
 
Plaintiffs also contend that Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. 
Prime Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1993), supports 
their claim that the boundaries of a relevant market may be 
defined by contract. In Virtual Maintenance, Ford Motor Co. 
granted Prime Computer an exclusive right to market Ford- 
designed software and software revisions that automobile 
design companies must use to design cars for Ford. Prime 
Computer sold the software revisions only in a package 
with uncompetitive hardware maintenance services. The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Prime could 
not legally exercise its monopoly power over software 
revisions to force customers to buy unwanted hardware 
maintenance contracts. Plaintiffs note that Prime's de facto 
monopoly power over software stemmed from a contract 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See Alan Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market Power", 65 
Antitrust L.J. 181, 217 (1996). 
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with Ford, which they argue implies that the boundaries of 
a market may be defined by contract. But Prime had a 
monopoly because it possessed a unique product that no 
one else sold. Since the product was unique, and not 
interchangeable with any other products, it constituted its 
own relevant market for antitrust purposes. By contrast, 
Domino's does not sell a unique product or service. 
Franchisees must buy Domino's-approved supplies and 
ingredients not because they are unique, but because they 
are obligated by contract to do so. 
 
Were we to accept plaintiffs' relevant market, virtually all 
franchise tying agreements requiring the franchisee to 
purchase inputs such as ingredients and supplies from the 
franchisor would violate antitrust law. Courts and legal 
commentators have long recognized that franchise tying 
contracts are an essential and important aspect of the 
franchise form of business organization because they 
reduce agency costs and prevent franchisees from free- 
riding -- offering products of sub-standard quality 
insufficient to maintain the reputational value of the 
franchise product while benefitting from the quality control 
efforts of other actors in the franchise system. 12 Franchising 
is a bedrock of the American economy. More than one third 
of all dollars spent in retailing transactions in the United 
States are paid to franchise outlets.13  We do not believe the 
antitrust laws were designed to erect a serious barrier to 
this form of business organization.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 
1342, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1987); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a 
(Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. 
L. Rev. 111, 117-119 (1996); Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors 
Have Market Power?, 65 Antitrust L.J. 105 145-47 (1996); Benjamin 
Klein and Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 346-48 (1985). 
13. Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power?, 65 
Antitrust L.J. 105, 105 n.1 (1996). 
 
14. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 387 (1967) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Indiscriminate 
invalidation of franchising arrangements would eliminate their creative 
contributions to competition and force suppliers to abandon franchising 
and integrate forward to the detriment of small business. In other words, 
we may inadvertently compel concentration by misguided zealousness.") 
(internal quotations omitted). The majority's opinion in Arnold was later 
overturned. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
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The purpose of the Sherman Act "is not to protect 
businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect 
the public from the failure of the market." Spectrum Sports, 
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). Here, plaintiffs' 
acceptance of a franchise package that included purchase 
requirements and contractual restrictions is consistent with 
the existence of a competitive market in which franchises 
are valued, in part, according to the terms of the proposed 
franchise agreement and the availability of alternative 
franchise opportunities. Plaintiffs need not have become 
Domino's franchisees. If the contractual restrictions in 
section 12.2 of the general franchise agreement were viewed 
as overly burdensome or risky at the time they were 
proposed, plaintiffs could have purchased a different form 
of restaurant, or made some alternative investment.15 They 
chose not to do so. Unlike the plaintiffs in Kodak, plaintiffs 
here must purchase products from Domino's Pizza not 
because of Domino's market power over a unique product, 
but because they are bound by contract to do so. If 
Domino's Pizza, Inc. acted unreasonably when, under the 
franchise agreement, it restricted plaintiffs' ability to 
purchase supplies from other sources, plaintiffs' remedy, if 
any, is in contract, not under the antitrust laws. 16 
 
For these reasons, we agree with the district court that 
plaintiffs have not pleaded a valid relevant market.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. As one scholar has noted, there are thousands of franchise 
opportunities available to investors and disclosure laws to help them 
make informed choices about these alternatives. George A. Hay, Is the 
Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 
Antitrust L.J. 177, 188 (1993). 
 
16. The dissent contends Domino's has acted in a "predatory way." But 
plaintiffs may have a right to sue for breach of contract. 
 
17. The reasoning adopted by the district court in this case has been 
criticized recently by two other district court decisions. See Wilson v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. La. 1996); Collins v. 
International 
Dairy Queen, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 875 (M.D. Ga. 1996). In Wilson, the 
court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Kodak, arguing 
that under Kodak information and switching costs alone, absent a 
unique product or service, may create a relevant market for antitrust 
purposes. As noted above, we disagree with this interpretation, for the 
Supreme Court specifically found that the copier parts involved in the 
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C. 
 
Plaintiffs' claim for attempt to monopolize fails for the 
same reasons. To prevail on an attempted monopolization 
claim under S 2 of the Sherman Act, "a plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant (1) engaged in predatory or anti- 
competitive conduct with (2) specific intent to monopolize 
and with (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan , 506 U.S. 447, 
456 (1993). Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 
F.3d 737, 750 (3d Cir. 1996); Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir. 1995). In 
order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability 
of monopolization, a court must inquire "into the relevant 
product and geographic market and the defendant's 
economic power in that market." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Ideal Dairy Farms at 
750; Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 24 F.3d 
508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Plaintiffs' attempted monopoly claim is predicated on the 
identical proposed relevant market underlying its monopoly 
claim: a market in the ingredients, supplies, and materials 
used by Domino's pizza stores. Because the products within 
this proposed market are interchangeable with other 
products outside of the proposed market, the claim was 
properly dismissed. 
 
D. 
 
Plaintiffs allege exclusive dealing arrangements entered 
into by Domino's Pizza, Inc. have unreasonably restrained 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
case were unique. The basis of the Collins court's criticism of the 
district 
court's decision here is less clear, though it appears the court believed 
that the district court's holding was too expansive. The Collins court 
apparently wished to reserve judgment whether some franchise tying 
arrangements might be deemed anti-competitive in the future. The 
approach taken by the district court in this case has received support in 
recent scholarly literature. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a 
(Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. 
L. Rev. 111, 128 (1996) ("economic theory suggests . . . that tying 
contracts that actually reduce free riding are unrelated to any exercise 
of market power"); Alan H. Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market 
Power", 65 Antitrust L.J. 181 (1996). 
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trade in violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal." 15 U.S.C. S 1. 
 
To establish a section 1 violation for unreasonable 
restraint of trade, a plaintiff must prove (1) concerted action 
by the defendants; (2) that produced anti-competitive 
effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; 
(3) that the concerted action was illegal; and (4) that the 
plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the concerted 
action. Mathews v. Lancaster General Hospital , 87 F.3d 
624, 639 (3d Cir. 1996); Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996); Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 
1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Plaintiffs allege defendant's actions caused anti- 
competitive effects within the market for ingredients and 
supplies used by Domino's pizza stores. Again, this claim 
fails because the products within the proposed market are 
interchangeable with products outside the proposed  
market.18 
 
E. 
 
Plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. imposed an unlawful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Monopoly power under S 2 requires "something greater" than market 
power under S 1. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481. This does not imply, however, 
that the analyses employed in the two types of cases to define relevant 
markets differ. In the past, we intimated that the relevant market 
analysis required under S 2 of the Sherman Act was "instructive" in S 1 
cases, though perhaps not identical. See Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 724 n. 
3. The Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently held that 
relevant markets under both sections are defined by the same two 
factors: reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticities of 
demand. See, e.g., Allen-Myland , 33 F.3d at 201 and 201 n. 8 (applying 
Brown Shoe relevant market test of reasonable interchangeability and 
cross-elasticity of demand in S 1 tying case). In this case, we see no 
difference in the relevant market analyses required under the two 
provisions. 
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tying arrangement by requiring franchisees to buy 
ingredients and supplies from them as a condition of 
obtaining Domino's Pizza fresh dough, in violation of S 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. "In a tying arrangement, 
the seller sells one item, known as the tying product, on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases another item, 
known as the tied product." Allen-Myland, Inc. v. 
International Business Machines Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 200 
(3d Cir. 1994). "[T]he antitrust concern over tying 
arrangements is limited to those situations in which the 
seller can exploit its power in the market for the tying 
product to force buyers to purchase the tied product when 
they otherwise would not, thereby restraining competition 
in the tied product market." Id. "Even if a seller has 
obtained a monopoly in the tying product legitimately (as by 
obtaining a patent), courts have seen the expansion of that 
power to other product markets as illegitimate and 
competition suppressing." Town Sound and Custom Tops, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 
1992). "The first inquiry in any S 1 tying case is whether the 
defendant has sufficient market power over the tying 
product, which requires a finding that two separate product 
markets exist and a determination precisely what the tying 
and tied products markets are." Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 
200-201. 
 
Here, plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. used its power 
in the purported market for Domino's-approved dough to 
force plaintiffs to buy unwanted ingredients and supplies 
from them. This claim fails because the proposed tying 
market -- the market in Domino's-approved dough-- is not 
a relevant market for antitrust purposes. Domino's dough 
is reasonably interchangeable with other brands of pizza 
dough, and does not therefore constitute a relevant market 
of its own. All that distinguishes this dough from other 
brands is that a Domino's franchisee must use it or face a 
suit for breach of contract. As we have noted above, the 
particular contractual restraints assumed by a plaintiff are 
not sufficient by themselves to render interchangeable 
commodities non-interchangeable for purposes of relevant 
market definition. If Domino's had market power in the 
overall market for pizza dough and forced plaintiffs to 
purchase other unwanted ingredients to obtain dough, 
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plaintiffs might possess a valid tying claim. But where the 
defendant's "power" to "force" plaintiffs to purchase the 
alleged tying product stems not from the market, but from 
plaintiffs' contractual agreement to purchase the tying 
product, no claim will lie. For that reason, plaintiffs' claim 
was properly dismissed. 
 
F. 
 
Plaintiffs allege Domino's Pizza, Inc. imposed an unlawful 
tie-in arrangement by requiring franchisees to buy 
ingredients and supplies "as a condition of their continued 
enjoyment of rights and services under their Standard 
Franchise Agreement," in violation of S 1 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. This claim is meritless. Though plaintiffs 
complain of an illegal tie-in arrangement, they have failed 
to point to any particular tying product or service over 
which Domino's Pizza, Inc, has market power. Domino's 
Pizza's control over plaintiffs' "continued enjoyment of 
rights and services under their Standard Franchise 
Agreement" is not a "market." Rather, it is a function of 
Domino's contractual powers under the franchise 
agreement to terminate the participation of franchisees in 
the franchise system if they violate the agreement. Because 
plaintiffs failed to plead any relevant tying market, the 
claim was properly dismissed. 
 
G. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs advance a new claim based on 
a different relevant market theory -- that Domino's has a 
monopoly in a relevant market comprised of pizza franchise 
opportunities of the type that Domino's Pizza, Inc. offers. 
Plaintiffs raise this new theory, which the district court did 
not address, in the hopes of obtaining a remand. 
 
Plaintiffs' argument that Domino's Pizza has monopolized 
a relevant market comprised of franchise opportunities of a 
particular sort was not raised or mentioned in their 
complaint, first amended complaint, memorandum of law in 
support of their motion for leave to file a second amended 
complaint, or in the "claims for relief" section of the 
proposed second amended complaint. When the district 
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court denied plaintiffs leave to file a second amended 
complaint, on grounds of futility, it had no idea that 
plaintiffs intended or desired to raise such a claim. "This 
court has consistently held that it will not consider issues 
that are raised for the first time on appeal." Harris v. City 
of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue that this claim was raised 
before the district court. In support of this contention, they 
note that facts which might support such a claim were 
pleaded in paragraphs 60 and 65 of their proposed second 
amended complaint. Though we construe pleadings 
liberally, plaintiffs have a duty to make the district court 
aware that they intend to rely on a particular relevant 
market theory. This is particularly true in a complex case 
like this one, where plaintiffs bring multiple antitrust 
claims based on multiple and alternative relevant market 
theories. See Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 
24 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff bound by 
relevant market theory raised before district court); TV 
Communications Network. Inc. v. Turner Network Television, 
Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Edward 
J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117 
(3d Cir. 1980) (same). We do not believe a fleeting reference 
in a proposed second amended complaint to facts that 
might support a proposed relevant market is sufficient, on 
its own, to preserve that relevant market theory for 
appellate review. See Frank v. Colt Industries, Inc., 910 F.2d 
90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) (issues not raised before district 
court are waived on appeal; fleeting reference to issue 
before district court insufficient to preserve it for appellate 
review). "Particularly where important and complex issues 
of law are presented, a far more detailed exposition of 
argument is required to preserve an issue." Id. at 100. 
Because this claim was not properly raised before the 
district court and is not properly before us, we decline to 
address it. See generally Salvation Army v. Department of 
Community Affairs of State of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d 
Cir. 1990) ("The matter of what questions may be taken up 
and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left 
primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be 
exercised on the facts of each case."). 
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H. 
 
Plaintiffs also contend the district court held that the 
availability of contract remedies prohibited recovery under 
antitrust laws. But this misstates the district court's 
holding. The district court held that Domino's Pizza's ability 
to block franchisees from purchasing ingredients from other 
sources stemmed from its exercise of contractual powers, 
not market power, and the remedy for this problem lies, if 
at all, under contract law. The court did not say that as a 
matter of law the availability of common law remedies 
prohibits recovery under an antitrust theory. We see no 
error. 
 
I. 
 
The district court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' remaining state law contract 
claims. This decision is committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court. Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 939 
(3d Cir. 1996); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 
Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (3d Cir. 1993). Because all 
federal claims were correctly dismissed and dismissal of the 
remaining contract claims would not be unfair to the 
litigants or result in waste of judicial resources, we see no 
abuse of discretion. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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LAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
The district court, at the pleading stage, dismissed 
plaintiffs' complaint alleging violations under S 1 and S 2 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act holding that plaintiffs failed to 
allege a relevant market. The issue is complex. Judge 
Scirica's opinion is logically reasoned. Our differences lie in 
the interpretation and application of the Supreme Court's 
recent opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). I respectfully submit, for 
the reasons that follow, that the district court's opinion in 
this case rests on several incorrect hypotheses. To the 
extent that the majority adopts the district court's 
rationale, I dissent. 
 
The district court rejected as a matter of law the 
plaintiffs' alleged relevant market, that of the derivative 
aftermarket for ingredients and supplies among Domino's 
Pizza, Inc. ("DPI")'s franchisees. The district court found 
that "[t]he economic power DPI possesses results not from 
the unique nature of the product or from its market share 
in the fast food franchise business, but from the franchise 
agreement."1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court relied on "two influential commentators," Benjamin 
Klein and Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 356 (1985) and two pre-Kodak cases, 
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. , 833 F.3d 1342 (9th 
Cir. 1987), and Tominaga v. Shepard, 682 F. Supp. 1489 (C.D. Cal. 
1988). The district court adopted the Ninth Circuit's analysis from 
Mozart that an alleged economic-lock-in is irrelevant to the 
determination of a defendant's market power. See Tominaga, 682 F. 
Supp. at 1494 (quoting Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1346-47). This reasoning is 
simply irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's analysis of information 
and switching costs in Kodak. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-77. 
 
It should also be noted Professor Klein recognized, contrary to his 
original thesis, that Kodak permits the recognition of market power in a 
derivative aftermarket "despite the absence of market power in the 
equipment market, by taking advantage of imperfectly informed 
consumers that become `locked-in' to their existing Kodak equipment." 
See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After 
Kodak, 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 48 (1993). 
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The plaintiffs allege that DPI has harmed the competitive 
process by "foreclos[ing] interbrand competition in the 
market for distributing approved Ingredients and Supplies 
to Domino's franchisees." The plaintiffs argue that DPI 
prevented a franchise cooperative and other distributors of 
ingredients and supplies from entering that market. By 
stopping any interbrand competition for ingredients and 
supplies for DPI franchisees, DPI, according to the 
pleadings, has excluded other potential distributors, and 
thereby preempted market forces from disciplining the sale 
of ingredients and supplies. 
 
Interchangeability 
 
In adopting the district court's approach to relevant 
market definition, the majority reasons that all ingredients 
and supplies, whether or not approved by DPI, are 
interchangeable for making pizzas generally and therefore 
must be included within the relevant market. Kodak made 
a similar argument. As in Kodak, this ignores the reality 
that there are no substitutes for ingredients and supplies 
sold only by DPI. The majority's approach to the 
interchangeability concept is not faithful to the purpose of 
interchangeability analysis or the Supreme Court's 
understanding of market definition and power. The purpose 
of analyzing interchangeability is to find competing 
products which are reasonable substitutes and thereby 
prevent market power.2 In Kodak, the question was whether 
the cross-elasticity of demand between the equipment 
market and the derivative aftermarkets for parts and 
service was sufficient to deprive Kodak of market power. 
Our question is whether the interchangeability of, or cross- 
elasticity of demand between, DPI-approved ingredients and 
supplies and other ingredients and supplies is sufficient to 
make the alleged relevant market invalid. The issue, 
whether under the framework of market power as it was in 
Kodak, or as market definition as here, is whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The basic definition of market power is "the power to raise prices 
above competitive levels without losing so many sales that the price 
increase is unprofitable." Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: 
The Law of Competition and its Practice S 3.1, at 79 (1994) (footnote 
omitted). 
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competition from other providers of ingredients and 
supplies for pizzas will restrain the power of DPI over 
ingredients and supplies it sells to franchisees. See Kodak, 
504 U.S. at 469 n.15. The plaintiffs allege not only that 
they are limited to buying ingredients and supplies from 
DPI, but also that information and switching costs 
prevented them from anticipating and being able to respond 
to DPI's power to substantially raise price for the 
ingredients and supplies. They allege that competition from 
independent providers of ingredients and supplies does not 
restrain DPI's power in the aftermarket for ingredients and 
supplies, and therefore ingredients and supplies not 
approved by DPI need not be included in the relevant market.3 
 
Information and Switching Costs 
 
A closely related problem with the district court's opinion 
is its scant treatment of information and switching costs 
and their relevance to defining a valid relevant market. The 
plaintiffs argue that they have experienced information and 
switching costs which have prevented them from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority, in footnote 17, ante at 20, states that the district 
court's 
approach has "received support in recent scholarly literature," citing 
Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case 
of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 111, 128 (1996). However, 
Professor Meese does not argue that the approach taken is correct under 
current antitrust law. In fact, on page 126 he concedes that the Kodak 
decision "found that the existence of relationship-specific investments 
can confer `market power' ", and at 152-55 he states that "under current 
law" franchisors may have market power over derivative aftermarkets 
due to "lock-in" of the franchisees, and because of this he proposes a 
new framework for analyzing such claims. He argues that "the focus on 
market power and less restrictive alternatives, though perfectly natural 
given the partial equilibrium framework that dominates antitrust law 
and the premises that underlie tying jurisprudence," does not properly 
apply to the franchise tying context. Id. at 128. Professor Meese argues 
that tying contracts that reduce free riding, a form of opportunistic 
behavior taken at the expense of the franchise system, should be prima 
facie legal. Whatever the value of Professor Meese's argument, he 
presupposes that "under current law" from the Supreme Court the 
district court in this case may have erred. Id. at 152. In addition, it is 
not even clear that Professor Meese would find the plaintiffs' allegations 
insufficient as a matter of law because they allege that DPI charged 
supracompetitive prices for the ingredients and supplies. See id. at 155. 
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anticipating or responding to the price increases for 
ingredients and supplies from DPI. They argue that these 
information and switching costs create a "lock-in" which 
makes the aftermarket for DPI-approved ingredients and 
supplies the relevant market. Specifically, the imperfect 
information they proffer is that the franchisees "could not 
foresee that Domino's would not follow the policy 
represented in its Offering Circular and would, instead, 
commence excluding potential suppliers in order to 
foreclose competition in the aftermarket." They suggest 
switching costs arise from sunk costs in the franchise, 
limits on franchisees's ability to sell their franchise, and 
noncompetition covenants in the Standard Franchise 
Agreement. 
 
An important part of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Kodak that the plaintiffs presented a triable claim was that 
"there is a question of fact whether information costs and 
switching costs foil the simple assumption that the 
equipment and service markets act as pure complements to 
one another." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477. In fact, other circuit 
courts have held that the presence of these market 
imperfections was the crucial factor in Kodak, and that had 
Kodak's policy been known at the time businesses bought 
copiers from Kodak, the result would have been different.4 
See PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 
820 (6th Cir. 1997) ("We likewise agree that the change in 
policy in Kodak was the crucial factor in the Court's 
decision. By changing its policy after its customers were 
`locked in,' Kodak took advantage of the fact that its 
customers lacked the information to anticipate this 
change."), cert. denied, 1997 WL 195257; see also Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 
(7th Cir. 1996); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This conclusion seems quite sensible. If Kodak customers knew about 
Kodak's subsequent parts-and-service policy when they bought the 
copiers, or were not economically restricted from switching to other 
copiers, then Justice Scalia's dissent, which assumes a perfect 
competition/perfect information world, should be right. Kodak is merely 
a concession to fact that markets do not always work perfectly, and 
sometimes, but not always, these imperfections can create sufficient 
market power to justify possible antitrust liability. 
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F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1994). Several commentators have 
described how the analysis from Kodak could mean that 
franchisors' derivative aftermarkets may be relevant 
antitrust markets. Meese, 95 Mich. L. Rev. at 152 ("Under 
current law, [post-contract market power] can arise once 
the cost to the franchisee of switching to a different 
franchise is significant. . . ."); Warren S. Grimes, When Do 
Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies For 
Franchisor Opportunism, 65 Antitrust L.J. 105, 112 (1996) 
("A franchisor has market power if it can, without losing 
substantial sales, raise the price of a good or service sold to 
a franchisee above the level at which an equivalent good or 
service is available from other suppliers."); see also Robert 
H. Lande, Chicago Takes It On The Chin: Imperfect 
Information Could Play A Crucial Role In The Post-Kodak 
World, 62 Antitrust L.J. 193, 195 (1993) ("Another 
important lesson of Kodak is that imperfect information can 
be a crucial factor in defining relevant markets."). But see 
Alan Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market Power", 65 
Antitrust L.J. 181, 217 (1996). 
 
Uniqueness 
 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' theory that the information and 
switching costs they face justify the alleged relevant market 
under Kodak, the majority states: "Kodak does not hold 
that the existence of information and switching costs alone, 
such as those faced by the Domino's franchisees, renders 
an otherwise invalid relevant market valid." Ante at 16 
(footnotes omitted). Both the district court and the majority 
make a more difficult argument, that a necessary factor in 
Kodak was that the repair parts were "unique." They state 
that this uniqueness is what gave Kodak market power, 
and that the lack of this factor herein warrants rejecting 
the plaintiffs' alleged relevant market. The basis for not 
applying Kodak in this case lies in two arguments: (1) the 
aftermarket ingredients and supplies are not unique, and 
(2) the franchisees knew of the policy bec 
